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Abstract
The analysis of data from electronic health records aspires to facilitate healthcare efficiencies and biomedical innovation.
There are also ethical, legal and social implications from the handling of sensitive patient information. The paper explores
the concerns, expectations and implications of the National Health Service (NHS) England care.data programme: a
national data sharing initiative of linked electronic health records for healthcare and other research purposes. Using
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity of privacy framework through a critical Science and Technology Studies (STS) lens, it
examines the way technologies and policies are developed to promote sustainability, governance and economic growth as
the de facto social values, while reducing privacy to an individualistic preference. The state, acting as a new, central data
broker reappropriates public ownership rights and establishes those information flows and transmission principles that
facilitate the assetisation of NHS datasets for the knowledge economy. Various actors and processes from other contexts
attempt to erode the public healthcare sector and privilege new information recipients. However, such data sharing
initiatives in healthcare will be resisted if we continue to focus only on the monetary and scientific values of these
datasets and keep ignoring their equally important social and ethical values.
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Introduction
In every part of the world, states work to ﬁnd ways to
open up and analyse the data they have been gathering
about their citizens and services, because they believe it
will have a transformative eﬀect on knowledge and ser-
vices (Verhulst et al., 2014). For example, in healthcare
such data initiatives tend to focus on creating value
through service eﬃciencies by sophisticated business
intelligence, improved healthcare practices and biomed-
ical innovation (DH, 2011). In the UK, it is estimated
that analysing data from NHS electronic health records
(EHRs) could result in eﬃciency gains of between £16.5
and £66 billion per year, while transforming the service
to a more proactive and personalised one (Bosanquet
and Evans, 2014). This commitment to generate wealth
out of NHS health data (DH, 2012b; HM Government,
2012) is also evident in calls to develop policy frame-
works and information technology (IT) infrastructures
that facilitate closer collaboration between the NHS
and commercial bioscience ﬁrms (BIGT, 2003; HITF,
2004) in order to accelerate biomedical research and
reduce costs (Pathak et al., 2013).
One such health data sharing initiative in the UK
was care.data,1 a programme of work for the develop-
ment of a central database with linked NHS hospital
and general practice (GP) records. Led by NHS
England and implemented by the Health and Social
Care Information Centre (HSCIC) it has the purpose
of collecting, de-identifying and linking datasets across
the NHS (Grace and Taylor, 2013). HSCIC, now called
NHS Digital, is an executive non-departmental public
body established by the Health and Social Care Act
(HSCA) (DH, 2012a) to replace NHS Connecting for
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Health and the NHS Information Centre. Sponsored
by the Department of Health, it provides informational
infrastructure to the NHS so as to collect centrally its
electronic health and social data for various analyses
and national statistics about population health and ser-
vice operation (Health Information and Quality
Authority, 2014). For care.data, it will collect identiﬁ-
able information, such as the NHS number, date of
birth, postcode and gender, as well as healthcare infor-
mation, such as family history, vaccinations, biological
values, diagnoses, referrals and NHS prescriptions. In
the future, it aims to oﬀer the service of linking the
pseudonymous datasets it holds to datasets supplied
by customers (Nuﬃeld Council on Bioethics, 2015).
Since 90% of patient care is non-hospital, care.data
will collect a wealth of sensitive personal health and
administrative data (Hoeksma, 2014) so as to support
whole population research for developing eﬀective care
pathways and service models.2 The programme, how-
ever, was stalled in February 2014 due to ethical con-
cerns, particularly in relation to its information
governance framework and data sharing arrangements.
It was eventually abandoned in July 2016 (Freeman,
2016). At ﬁrst, it appears that HSCIC was forced to
postpone its plans for extracting and linking primary
and secondary care data because of certain privacy, and
(we argue) commercial, concerns.3 This became more
evident after a public outcry due to a notable data
sharing ﬁasco from its predecessor where hospital
data was sold to actuaries (Donnelly, 2014).
To study the controversies and the resistance to this
programme by the public and (some) healthcare profes-
sional bodies alike, we ﬁrst apply Nissenbaum’s (2010)
conceptual framework of contextual integrity (CI) to
privacy by paying particular attention to the technol-
ogy and policy-making that has placed HSCIC in the
centre of NHS information exchanges. We use this
framework to describe what new information ﬂows car-
e.data aspired to introduce between data subjects, sen-
ders and recipients of information as well as new
principles and norms for the public healthcare context.
We also attempt to show how certain actors in the
wider political-economic context value this data and
attempt to erode the public healthcare context so as
to privilege other goals and ends. We do this by exam-
ining how certain actors and their interests shaped the
direction of the programme for the transferring of data
to the private (healthcare) sector from the public
healthcare sector.
Therefore, we also treat care.data as a political-eco-
nomic as much as a technical or ethical phenomenon
(Davies et al., 2013). As critical STS scholars have
demonstrated with biomedicine and, generally, with
life sciences (Cooper, 2008), EHRs under care.data
appeared to follow a similar path of capitalisation.
They depict the same threefold relation between know-
ledge and value: the ethical value of improving health,
accountability audits for better services and the monet-
ary transactional value of innovation (Rajan and
Leonelli, 2013). For the private sector, such scientiﬁc
and economic endeavours are always risky and politic-
ally sensitive which means that the private sector will
not fully engage with them from the outset. Therefore,
this new state-driven data sharing initiative carried its
own normative assumptions of size and speed (Davies
et al., 2013) to justify its necessity (Lezaun and
Montgomery, 2015). It also attempted to instil what
we consider (and present below) a new set of duties
for patients–citizens and the public healthcare sector.
Such big personal health data sharing programmes,
we argue, expect patients and professionals to share as
much personal healthcare information as possible
within the circle of care. The NHS is increasingly
obliged to collect and disseminate datasets for admin-
istrative and research purposes that may go beyond the
context and operation of the public healthcare sector.
Preferred economies of scale, available infrastructures,
organisational capabilities, public engagement strate-
gies and business modelling envelope this context and
transactionalise its principles for new, de-contextualised
information ﬂows. In a political-economic context of
increased public services privatisation and austerity,
the above duties are gradually shifting the obligations
of citizens, healthcare professionals and the NHS (with
regards to the collection and analysis of personal health
information) from the requirements and needs of the
individual as a member of the society, to those of bigger
actors (i.e. the state, market, science) for the assetisa-
tion of NHS primary care datasets and their introduc-
tion into the knowledge and commercial economies. In
this way, we believe we provide a new and useful
approach in overcoming the NHS data sharing conun-
drum, which is located in a divisive rhetoric of privacy
against healthcare improvement and economic prosper-
ity, and show why such initiatives are resisted and will
continue to do so in the near future.
Contextual approach to privacy
Nissenbaum (2010) developed the framework of CI to
study, from a moral and political point of view, privacy
concerns around new social–technical ITs and provide
policy solutions to actual problems of information col-
lection, analysis and dissemination. For her, a privacy
conundrum should not be about sharing information or
not. Such views tend to narrow the discussion down to
their diﬀerences while we seek ways to sacriﬁce one over
the other (Taylor, 2014). Privacy is about appropriate
sharing of information within a given context
(Nissenbaum, 2010). For example, the type and
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amount of information I share with my healthcare pro-
fessional, and the privacy expectations we both hold
around this exchange of information, are diﬀerent
when I move to the context of family or employment.
Instead, CI helps us to examine new ‘information ﬂows’
and ‘principles of transmission’ between ‘subjects’, ‘pro-
viders’ and ‘recipients’ that respect the norms and ends
of a particular context (Nissenbaum, 2010).
Nissenbaum (2010) also acknowledges the fact that
people may accept novel information ﬂows, and, as a
result, less privacy, if these ﬂows can demonstrate their
moral superiority and eﬀectiveness over established
ones, without disturbing contextual values. If not,
then the integrity of the context is violated.
A ﬁnal moral and political question that
Nissenbaum (2010) calls us to answer when we examine
new information ﬂows is who, in the end, are the new
recipients of information. This means that the public’s
resistance to data initiatives may not always be fuelled
by the level of information aggregation which an omni-
bus provider may support, but that this is being
achieved in a way that favours stronger actors, who
become the new information recipients and can use
this information for their own beneﬁt (Nissenbaum,
2010). Consequently, for every system that introduces
novel information ﬂows, we need to assess the moral
claims and interests of the various actors involved. We
need to examine whether, how and to what outcome
‘principles attaching to social goods in one sphere intrude
into the distribution of goods in another’ (Nissenbaum,
2010: 168). In the case of care.data, we can say that this
dispute between the two contexts was highlighted in a
recent Health Committee about the handling of NHS
data where the Chair of HSCIC explained the perceived
conﬂicting policy framework within which the centre
has to operate (House of Commons, 2014):
I have two separate drivers, one of which is an open data
agenda, which has been pursued by all Governments in
the past decade. That agenda is aimed at making as much
data available for as many people as possible, in the belief
that it will result in signiﬁcant beneﬁts in terms of
improving eﬃciency within the health care system, and
in the wider economy. Against that is a very principled
position, and I understand it, of those who say, ‘I don’t
want my data used for that purpose’. That is a totally
legitimate discussion that should be undertaken under the
new regime.
The duty to share
In healthcare, one of the most important principles
governing transmission of information is conﬁdential-
ity. This healthcare professional duty is based on a
mutual agreement that any exchange of information
between a patient and a clinician about symptoms
and treatments will not be shared with others. There
is an expectation, codiﬁed in conﬁdentiality agree-
ments, that patients’ information does not leave their
‘circle of care’ (Perera et al., 2011). Although modern
healthcare requires increased (electronic) information
ﬂows to various professionals and organisations,
which might be judged as a prima facie privacy viola-
tion, since they permit breaches of previously estab-
lished informational norms, these are not usually
resisted (on the contrary, they are expected) by patients
because they are there to support their care. For exam-
ple, the seventh Caldicott principle makes patient data
sharing a responsibility for every healthcare profes-
sional in the NHS: ‘the duty to share information can
be as important as the duty to protect patient conﬁden-
tiality’ (DH, 2013), while the updated NHS
Constitution makes ‘every willing patient..a research
patient..in the ﬁght against disease at home and around
the world’ (HM Government, 2011). Consequently,
these new transmission principles that the modern
healthcare context supports are considered scientiﬁcally
and morally superior, in the pursuit of eﬃcient commu-
nication, so as to provide patients with the best possible
care while running a cost-eﬀective service.
Moreover, clinicians and researchers are expected to
practice under professional codes of ethics. As custo-
dians of data they operate under speciﬁc rules of con-
ﬁdentiality. They have also developed consent
procedures that explain the risks and beneﬁts of treat-
ment or research in order to obtain permission from
patients. However, it is not the eﬃcacy of consent
itself that has established its virtue in healthcare, but
rather the trust patients warrant to these professionals
and institutions insofar as they are thought to be doing
the best they can to improve their health (Nissenbaum,
2011). They trust the whole system (Dixon-Woods and
Tarrant, 2009). Informed consent, then, is a token that
does not necessarily symbolise their understanding of
research aims (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007) and treat-
ments, but their commitment to the practices of those
responsible for their well-being, and a token of respect
for their autonomy. Therefore, until now, transmission
principles in the healthcare context usually involved
information shared voluntarily for treatment or
research, requiring the knowledge and permission of
the patient (Nissenbaum, 2010). Whether proposed
uses fell within the scope of the original consent
depended on what was ‘proposed scientiﬁcally, expect-
ations of participants, and social mores at the time of an
application’ (Laurie, 2009: 1676).
Driven by the principles of the healthcare context,
such as fairness and beneﬁcence (Chan and Harris,
2009), it seems that most patients would probably
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participate in healthcare research (even via their health
records and without explicit consent) to support those
institutions that support their health, and for the public
good (Carter et al., 2015). Giving their healthcare data
for research purposes (or at least not opting out), espe-
cially in the context of a national health system, is
understood as an act entailing reciprocity (Busby and
Martin, 2006). Despite the fact that in the UK there are
other similar (academic and not-for-proﬁt) NHS data
sharing initiatives, such as QResearch, ResearchOne
and CPRD,4 that are facilitating public health research
from GP records; these have not attracted the public
criticism and opposition that the care.data initiative did
(Clemence et al., 2013). The public and healthcare pro-
fessionals are largely supportive of such initiatives for
public health research purposes (Torjesen, 2014),
although some confusion over issues of conﬁdentiality,
data security and legal assurances has been noted (see
Brown et al., 2010). In any other case, this implied con-
sent would have probably been extended to the
care.data initiative but not this time.
The duty to not opt out
An opt-in model is usually considered a more ethical
(Willison et al., 2003) approach to active and autono-
mous decision-making. However, for population-wide
studies of low risk or for service planning and auditing,
an opt-out model is considered a more scientiﬁcally
valid and practical alternative (Singleton and
Wadsworth, 2006) as it enables bigger and less biased
samples (Berry et al., 2012). Healthcare research from
EHRs can be greatly enhanced as all data is drawn
from the same sample population, thus reducing bias,
while revealing inequalities in healthcare (Macleod and
Watt, 2008). This is particularly important for diﬃcult
to recruit or marginalised study populations (Ridgeway
et al., 2013). In any case, when it comes to sharing of
NHS data a rigorous opt-out process is expected to
serve as the ‘ethical minimum’ (Sterckx et al., 2015).
In the UK, overriding the common law duty of con-
ﬁdentiality in the NHS is usually possible under Section
251 of the NHS Act 2006. This exemption allows for
the disclosure of patient-identiﬁable data to a third
party without patient consent if data will be used for
medical purposes, seeking consent is not practical and
anonymisation is not possible.5 The Health Service
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations (DH,
2002) speciﬁes that for medical research purposes
approvals are granted by the Health Research
Authority, while for all other cases responsibility res-
ides with the Secretary of State. However, it was
because of the 2012 HSCA and the care.data that
data releases to NHS England became obligatory for
every health and social care provider. Grace and
Taylor (2013) note that these mandated data extrac-
tions, particularly in relation to the Data Protection
Act 1998, the common law duty of conﬁdentiality and
the NHS Constitution, may be perceived by patients as
an attempt by the government to override, without ‘suf-
ﬁcient legal basis’, their rights to know how and object
to, their conﬁdential data being used for purposes
beyond their direct care. In fact, public consultations
have pointed to the fact that interested stakeholders
would have liked more information: the public about
informed choice on participation, GPs about uses for
informed education of their patients and researchers
about uses for informed applications.6
Therefore, this new obligation created pressure on
many practices that did not have the resources to fulﬁl
it (Matthews-King, 2014b). Suddenly, the majority of
GPs had a responsibility to inform patients about a pro-
gramme they knew little about (NAO, 2015). As data
controllers (and thus legally liable for the patient infor-
mation they collect7) they had an inconsistent statutory
obligation both to disclose the data to HSCIC and to
process personal data fairly.8 After increased public
pressure, NHS England agreed to do a publicity cam-
paign about care.data to inform the public, but this was
restricted mainly to one leaﬂet per household and some
YouTube videos (Triggle, 2014). Moreover, the infor-
mation provided, which was sent out without proper
checks by the programme’s Independent Information
Governance Oversight Panel (IIGOP), was unconvin-
cing and was later deemed ‘unﬁt for purpose’ (DH,
2015). It was perceived as biased towards the suggested
beneﬁts of the initiative, with little information about
the opt-out procedure (Vallance, 2014). Patients who
decided not to share their data outside the NHS
would have had to opt out of sharing information alto-
gether, aﬀecting those who would have liked to partici-
pate in research but not in other data uses (Shaw, 2014).
The British Medical Association (BMA, 2014) and GPs
(Matthews-King, 2014c) insisted that, for this pro-
gramme of secondary uses beyond direct care, an opt-
in approach was more appropriate.
After the Information Governance Review
(Department of Health, 2013), NHS England com-
mitted to respecting patients’ preferences on a statutory
basis (Swinford, 2014). Patients could register a type 1
objection if they did not want their data leaving the GP
practice or a type 2 objection if they did not want their
data leaving the HSCIC in any identiﬁable form
(Roebuck, 2014). It was unclear whether after a type
2 objection a patient could still be approached again for
direct care services (e.g., e-referrals).9 NHS England
had never considered the full extent of these concerns
which became evident from the fact that it did not ini-
tially have the capability to process the growing
number of opt outs (Merrick, 2015) and had to work
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for over a year to start processing the resulting 1.5m
opt outs (HSCIC, 2016). Moreover, while the HSCIC
initially set itself as the only data controller after the
extraction of patient records for care.data, in the end, it
accepted joint data control with GPs.10 GPs now had a
statutory duty to share this information unless their
patients decided otherwise and opted out (Matthews-
King, 2014a). These developments also led to the estab-
lishment of the role of the National Data Guardian so
as to review data sharing and security in the NHS and
recommend on more simpliﬁed and streamlined opt-out
processes (Caldicott, 2016). At the same time, after the
public outcry (2014) an advisory group11 was estab-
lished by NHS England to help care.data get back on
track, in 2016 this group was replaced by a new over-
sight board.12 This time, however, privacy campaigners
and civil liberties groups were left out of the meetings.
The duty to accept the risk
During the last decade, there have been repeated calls
for new laws, information governance policies and
ethics procedures for greater, faster and appropriate
access to NHS data (Academy of Medical Sciences,
2011). It is believed that the current (complex) situation
is too conservative and inclined towards privacy and
autonomy at the expense of the public interest
(Academy of Medical Sciences, 2006). It instils a fear
of litigation across researchers, healthcare professionals
and institutions (Clark and Weale, 2011). It slows down
and burdens (ﬁnancially) good research (Academy of
Medical Sciences, 2006). For data initiatives, such as
care.data, that require the linkage of disparate datasets,
complete anonymisation of data would simply render
the programme impractical. In this debate between pri-
vate and public the stakes are clear: too much emphasis
on autonomy and privacy risks good research.
On the other hand, risk is also increased due to the
centralised nature of the care.data. One central database
enjoys economies of scale, but it maximises the suscep-
tibility of datasets to malicious activities. In fact, the
number of medical data attacks is growing (ITRC,
2014); for example, 79 million records were compro-
mised at US insurance company Anthem, which shows
that sophisticated security systems are often insuﬃcient
to safeguard a database (Mathews, 2015). The NHS has
become the single largest reporter of data breaches to the
ICO (Murphy, 2015). There are also secondary threats
from malicious inference from legitimately released
data. These cannot be resolved by improved cyber-
security because they only make use of data available
legitimately (HSCIC, 2014). While many in the ﬁeld
acknowledge an increased risk of data abuse, they also
believe that as long as appropriate measures are in place,
such initiatives can be justiﬁed (Faden et al., 2013).
Aggregated databases may also produce information
beyond a given dataset. Importantly, the simplicity of
this record linking and digital processing makes the
accuracy of the complete patient record extremely dif-
ﬁcult to dispute and may systematically compound
social inequalities (Nuﬃeld Council on Bioethics,
2015). A DNA sequence, for example, may reveal infor-
mation not only about a patient but also about her
family (Gertz, 2004), while aggregate genomic data car-
ries a high risk of re-identiﬁcation (Erlich and
Narayanan, 2014). Data mining may lead to proﬁling
with signiﬁcant social consequences. Existing bio-banks
already seek to link their data with records of criminal
convictions, earnings and employment data.13
HSCIC recognised the operational risks from
inappropriate access or imperfect anonymisation of
data (Dickinson, 2013). It also accepted the main risk
involved in pseudonymisation – the practice of repla-
cing the main patient identiﬁer (i.e. NHS number) with
a unique but meaningless pseudonym (Oswald, 2014) –
which is the possibility of re-identiﬁcation of individ-
uals when various datasets are linked together. In
response, HSCIC became an ‘accredited safe haven’
(DH, 2013) to ensure that such risks are minimised
and access restricted to accredited researchers who
meet speciﬁc criteria (Academy of Medical Sciences,
2011). Importantly, it remained sceptical about pseudo-
nymisation at source (assigning the pseudonym before
the extraction) due to the varied healthcare settings and
information systems from which data was to be
extracted (NHS England, 2014). However, it is working
to ensure that any access to pseudonymised, linked,
datasets (and any attempts by analysts to re-identify
individuals) will be subject to sanction by the ICO
(NHS England, 2014). It is unclear whether this is
solely for pseudonymised data, since standard and
bespoke extracts of personal conﬁdential data are pos-
sible at the moment under a data-sharing contract.
They just cost more.14 Despite the fact that literature
has ample evidence that demonstrate the limitations of
this de-identiﬁcation mechanism (O’Hara, 2011), cen-
tral and eﬀective pseudonymisation allows HSCIC to
(cost-eﬃciently) process NHS data outside current data
protection regulations and without any particular obli-
gations to the data subjects (ICO, 2012). From there,
they can become available for disclosure15 and pro-
cessed without always knowing accurately who ﬁnal
data recipients might be.16
The duty to assetise
The 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, the recession and the
prevailing pro-market political-economic approach to
public sector administration, as well as the dismantling
of the welfare state, have placed the NHS under
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immense pressure to close its funding gap. From the
Wanless Report to the ‘Nicholson Challenge’, succes-
sive UK governments have concentrated their eﬀorts on
accelerating eﬃciency gains and productivity improve-
ments, rather than increasing NHS funding out of tax-
ation (Appleby et al., 2014). Simultaneously, the 2012
HSCA epitomised the privatisation of the NHS via the
contracting of NHS services to private providers
(Pollock, 2015). With personal data being termed as
the new asset (Schwab et al., 2011) in this post-indus-
trial information era and its economic value amounting
to a new kind of equity (Mohamed and Ismail, 2012)
for organisations and businesses to increase their cap-
ital, NHS data is also seen as a valuable source of
income for the sustainability of the NHS (see George
Freeman, 2010; Martin and Hollin, 2014).
Actors from the wider public and private sectors,
including the pharmaceutical and insurance industries,
have always been interested in getting access to NHS
data (Tiner, 2007). HSCIC was (before the public
outcry) able to tailor its data service to these potential
customers’ needs (McKinsey & Company, 2014). The
purpose has not been to make a direct proﬁt out of the
selling of these data assets – any associated fees are
usually there to cover the costs of dataset preparation
and the auditing and managing of the contracts. It is
more about facilitating data sharing among actors
within the wider economy that can exploit them for
knowledge and proﬁt (Schwab et al., 2011). For exam-
ple, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) pur-
chased all HES records between 1997 and 2010
combined with credit ratings and deprivation (IFoA,
2014). While it is unclear from the published report
how the datasets were linked and by whom, its
researchers were able to advise the health insurance
sector on pricing practices for ﬁrst incidences of critical
illnesses by using geodemographic proﬁling from actual
(individual-level and anonymised) data rather ‘relying
on approximations’ (IFoA, 2014: 9). Interest is also
growing from other government departments, such as
the Department of Work and Pensions (Baldwin, 2014),
the Police and the National Crime Agency. The
Partridge Data Review (HSCIC, 2014) was particularly
illuminating. More than half of data releases (from the
sample studied) were made to various private sector
organisations under a rather dubious information gov-
ernance framework (HSCIC, 2014). HSCIC had subse-
quently to change its contract policy and become more
transparent by developing a basic register with data
access contracts.17
Despite the fact that several surveys have shown that
the public does not trust commercial companies with
their data, whether legitimately accessed or not
(Clemence et al., 2013; Wellcome Trust, 2013), and
would not like to see their data being shared solely
for commercial gain (Hill et al., 2013; Wellcome
Trust, 2013), the updated legislative framework (Care
Act 2014, 2014) still does not draw distinctions between
the private and the public sector when it comes to data
access requests. While it emphasises respect for
patients’ privacy by HSCIC (section 253), proﬁt-
making is not strictly prohibited. Therefore, any organ-
isation can request, receive and analyse NHS data as
long as it can justify that the information will be used
for the provision of services and the promotion of
health (section 261). For example, a pharmaceutical
company can request data to study, for ‘public beneﬁt’,
the eﬃcacy of a drug even if the company beneﬁts
ﬁnancially as well. The current regulatory and technical
framework appears ‘to want to keep the scope of poten-
tial uses broad, in the spirit of treating data as a resource
with multiple and undeﬁned potential uses’ (Nuﬃeld
Council on Bioethics, 2015: 112). However, this is to
be expected. Understanding data accumulation in
market terms, listing all potential secondary (re-)uses
to citizens for informed decision-making is impossible.
An omnibus information provider always has to plan
ahead and continuously prepare for future, yet to be
identiﬁed, data collection requirements and uses
(Andrejevic, 2013). In healthcare, a viable return on
investment can only be generated by the multiple use
of datasets produced from large-scale, accelerated and
inexpensive studies (Gaye et al., 2014). This is why,
when it comes to data sharing initiatives and secondary
uses, ‘notice and consent’ is treated as being impractical
(Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier, 2013). That is why
data cannot be conceived as a commodity but more
of an asset ready to be deployed, according to market
directions.
Conclusions
In this paper, we used the framework of CI to oﬀer an
alternative reading of the care.data conundrum by
avoiding the dichotomy between what is public and
private health data. We focused not only on the new
systems, legal and policy frameworks establishing new
information ﬂows and transmission principles, but also
on identifying actors and processes that attempt to
erode the public healthcare sector while privileging
new information recipients. Care.data can be under-
stood as an attempt by the state to place itself as the
new, central, data broker (Keen et al., 2013) by estab-
lishing those information ﬂows and transmission prin-
ciples that would facilitate the assetisation of NHS
datasets for the ﬁnancialisation of the knowledge econ-
omy (Lazzarato, 2009). After any ‘ownership’ rights
had been reappropriated, these datasets would have
been re-contextualised and rented to actors in other
parts of the scientiﬁc and economic industries to extract
6 Big Data & Society
surplus value. However, this process has proved not to
be that straightforward. NHS datasets do not hold only
one (monetary) value, but a range of other scientiﬁc,
social and ethical values (Birch and Tyﬁeld, 2013) that
often determine the fate of their assetisation.
From a CI perspective, patients, as data subjects,
provide (personal conﬁdential) – and hard to alter if
something goes wrong – information about symptoms
they experience to their GP who then receives and rec-
ords this for patient management. After GPs, HSCIC is
the second-stage recipient of this longitudinal informa-
tion that processes this data for all sorts of analyses
related to the operation and ﬁnancing of the NHS.
The original aspirations of care.data and the data dis-
closure to IFoA – before data extractions for care.data
even started – can be understood as ‘evidence of a clash
of contexts’ (Nissenbaum, 2010: 225). It alerted parts of
the society that the context of the NHS is changing
beyond that which was originally agreed.
Undoubtedly, conﬁdentiality, reciprocity and auton-
omy, with regards to notice and consent, are fundamen-
tal principles in the healthcare and academic research
contexts. Patients still expect that they can trust GPs
with their information and that GPs are capable of
making good use of it to treat them as well as others,
with a certain level of transparency and accountability.
Patients also appear to strongly maintain their rights
and engage with decision-making processes about sec-
ondary uses. The new context of information sharing
that care.data and the new regulations initially implied
was that patients should also contribute data for the
country’s economic prosperity, in the widest and most
ambiguous sense of the term. This new, economically
narrowed, value caused care.data to be perceived as a
threat to a long established social licence for research
within the NHS and healthcare, particularly around
issues of trust, the new obligations of GPs in their rela-
tionship with patients and NHS patient data as a public
good (Carter et al., 2015). It signalled that a new kind
of social contract of shared investment and risk
between patients and the NHS is in the making
(Carter et al., 2015). It showed that there are now
(unknown) actors outside the NHS that want to
become new recipients of patients’ data, free and with-
out patients’ and GPs’ having the opportunity to
express an opinion. The attempted mandatory patient
data extractions across the NHS, without a choice for
GPs and patients, led care.data to be seen as a pater-
nalistic and hurried process of ‘conscription’ (Sterckx
et al., 2015). When patients became aware of the end-
less possibilities that could open up from combining
these healthcare datasets with other datasets from
other industries, they also became aware of the poten-
tial misuses of this data. Various public and private
actors were already working to develop the technical
and legal frameworks for secondary uses before this
programme was ever brought to the public and GPs
for consultation.
In a recent report by Ipsos MORI for the Wellcome
Trust (Castell and Evans, 2016), researchers came to
similar conclusions and talked about ‘context collapse’
as way to explain how the realisation of health data
being used in commercial contexts confuses the public
and makes it suspicious, as well as protective of their
data. They concluded that, a clear public beneﬁt and
some kind of consent (for any kind of research) had to
be demonstrated and provided before the public
becomes comfortable with sharing their data.
Insurance and marketing, and, to a certain extent,
pharmaceutical, companies were not seen as appropri-
ate data recipients. Trust in new information ﬂows was
also largely linked to transparency and accountability.
Reaction to care.data seems to be based on the
understanding that NHS data, coming from a network
of organisations funded by the public for supporting
the healthcare of all citizens, is a public good and
should not engage in market exchanges. The exchange
of information within the healthcare context takes
place on a voluntary and consensual way. In the com-
mercial context it takes place according to the rules of
the market. While the former context is there to sup-
port health, the latter is there to support capital accu-
mulation. Therefore, proﬁt-making on this data is seen
as an end contrary to the goals of the NHS. Disclosure
of NHS data to actors and industries that have not
traditionally been part of (publicly funded) healthcare,
and are not expected to give something back to the
NHS, will be treated as problematic and are likely to
be highly resisted. Private insurance and marketing
industries will experience resistance, as not only are
they motivated by proﬁt, but they are also not expected
to reciprocally improve the NHS or contribute to its
sustainability. Their business is about providing
highly diﬀerentiated products and services to a small
number of individual customers who can aﬀord them
and is predicated on excluding potential customers on
the basis of their health conditions. Pharmaceutical
companies, while they are expected to give something
back to the NHS (e.g., drugs) from their analyses of
NHS data, are perceived to have done this at a great
cost to the service. Proﬁt-making in conjunction
with discriminatory or disadvantageous (for the
public and the NHS) use of NHS data will probably
be strongly contested.
Moreover, we already mentioned a number of not-
for-proﬁt academic and governmental databases that
facilitate healthcare research, but compared to care.-
data they have diﬀerent transmission principles. They
collect data from GP practices through practices opting
in and patients can exercise one simple opt out.
Vezyridis and Timmons 7
Academic healthcare research is founded on certain
principles, strongly endorsed by the public: transpar-
ency, accountability and scientiﬁc scrutiny. While
there is still a lot of work to be done, researchers are
actively calling for further development of these prin-
ciples, for example via the release of datasets, study
protocols (Iqbal et al., 2016) and the analytic codes
used (Goldacre, 2016).
Undoubtedly, the NHS has entered the new infor-
mational era and aspires to lead the way in digital
health. It makes increasing use of EHR data and it
is strategically exploring opportunities in consumer
health informatics, for example, via the provision of
free devices and apps to patients so as to instil per-
sonal engagement and accountability in the preven-
tion, self-care and management of patients’ illnesses
(Campbell, 2016). However, while people choose to
join an online social network or buy a wearable
device for better, faster and more personalised services
this does not mean that they will always have to agree
to every new information ﬂow and that their data is
up for grabs and exploitation. Parts of the user com-
munity are always on alert to protest against new
information ﬂows that violate their expectations of
privacy (Fletcher, 2010) and how other actors are
trying to proﬁt out of the unpaid and aﬀective ‘imma-
terial labour’ (Terranova, 2000) they have put in to
feed the platform with their data. As the public’s
awareness of such issues and practices increases so
will its sense of privacy violations (Nissenbaum, 2010).
Therefore, the conundrum, particularly in healthcare
and around care.data, is not just about privacy versus
openness (Vayena and Gasser, 2016). Such dichotom-
ous approaches tend to substitute political, economic
and ethical discussions for organisational processes,
computational frameworks of security and appropriate
de-identiﬁcation methodologies. By concentrating dis-
cussions on the (im-)practicability of consent, other,
equally important issues are left out: who ought to
have access to data, for what (dis)advantageous pur-
poses and what are the ﬁnancial issues at stake.
Based on the four duties (to share, to not opt out, to
accept the risk, to assetise) we identiﬁed here, we can
argue that non-egalitarian and unprincipled approaches
to autonomy and reciprocity may backﬁre and foster
resistance that may render such data sharing initiatives
useless in practice. As the patient–clinician relationship
gets jeopardised due to the lack of trust around protec-
tion of sensitive data from market-driven exploitation
and discriminatory practices, more people may avoid
GPs, delay appointments, withhold crucial health infor-
mation or even provide false information to their clin-
ician (Clark and Weale, 2011). We may see more
patients avoiding healthcare research and opting out
of these databases. This will aﬀect the accuracy and
completeness of EHRs (NHS England, 2014), creating
biased datasets (Pollock and Roderick, 2014).
As care.data amply demonstrated, there is a new
policy direction that aims at constituting sustainability,
governance and economic growth as the de facto social
values, while reducing privacy (as a reassurance of
trust, exercise of choice and protection from exploit-
ation) to an individualistic preference (Nuﬃeld
Council on Bioethics, 2012). It subtly implies that it
would be individuals, rather than organisations or
public institutions, who will be forced to deal person-
ally with the healthcare, social and ﬁnancial conse-
quences of ever-increasing and ambiguous data
dissemination practices (Ro¨ssler, 2005) among entities
they are not always aware of. If successful, an economic
rationality and governmentality (McNay, 2009),
founded on a transactional understanding of potential
beneﬁts and rights, risks and rewards in healthcare, will
gradually prevail. The integrity of public healthcare will
be compromised, nurturing more healthcare and infor-
mational challenges for it.
Therefore, for such initiatives to succeed, the afore-
mentioned principles, such as transparency, account-
ability, (socio-)scientiﬁc scrutiny, need to be
reinforced judicially so as to eﬀect those information
ﬂows and data uses that support patients’ equal know-
ledge of the actors, workings and ﬂows of their sensitive
health information (Kelly et al., 2015). Otherwise, the
next conundrum in healthcare will focus on how actors
and processes of the new healthcare context (with
regards to principles and information ﬂows) may risk
good health services (Nissenbaum, 2010) and the pres-
ervation of the NHS as the fundamental pillar of the
collective health of the nation. We should always be
reminded that all this wealth of digitised public health
data is now available for various kinds of research and
for the greater good not only because of the recent
computational, scientiﬁc and clinical advances in data
processing and analysis, but also because of long-stand-
ing principles and fundamental rights, guaranteed to
every individual member of the public, exercised
securely and autonomously across multiple contexts
(Dawes, 2011) within society.
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Notes
1. https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data/.
2. http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/15110/Benefits-plan—
caredata-updated-addendum/pdf/Benefits_plan_-_care.
data_addendum_v2.0.pdf.
3. https://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/02/19/response-info-
share/.
4. www.qresearch.org; www.researchone.org; www.cprd.
com.
5. http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/our-committees/
section-251/what-is-section-251/.
6. http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/15110/Benefits-plan—
caredata-updated-addendum/pdf/Benefits_plan_-_care.
data_addendum_v2.0.pdf.
7. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-pro-
tection/key-definitions/.
8. https://web.archive.org/web/20140810130424/http://
www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/cd-gp-
faq-03-14.pdf.
9. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevi-
dence.svc/evidencedocument/health-committee/handling-
of-nhs-patient-data/written/17671.html.
10. https://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/02/19/response-info-
share/.
11. http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/
2015-12-15/HL4600/.
12. http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/
2016-01-20/HL5266/.
13. http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers/resources-
available/data-details/linkage/.
14. http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14839/DARS—Service-
charges/pdf/dles_service_charges__2015_16_V10_
050913_WIP.pdf.
15. https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/review_of_
pseudonymisation_at_so#incoming-496410.
16. See Q272 at http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidenceHtml/8416.
17. www.hscic.gov.uk/dataregister.
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